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Forthcoming in Philosophical Review.  
 
The project Catherine Elgin embarks on in her latest book, True Enough, is expansive and 
ambitious. The book shares its title with a 2004 paper of Elgin’s, and both take inspiration from 
the role—apparently epistemic—in science played by idealizations and other falsehoods. But, 
whereas the earlier paper focuses on motivating a particular view of scientific understanding on 
that basis, this book is a wide-ranging project in epistemology. I interpret it as including three 
main parts: (1) advocating for the epistemic significance of understanding in the place of 
knowledge and a corresponding weakening of the requirement of true belief; (2) developing a 
coherentist epistemology that replaces the externalist requirement of reliability with internalist 
responsibility; and (3) showing how artistic representation is of a piece with scientific 
representation and other epistemic achievements.  
 
The first of these relates most directly to debates in philosophy of science and the interests that 
brought me to this book. Traditionally, science’s epistemic aim (if any) was supposed to be 
knowledge, and one requirement for knowledge was truth. But, as Elgin points out, there’s a 
deep problem with this. What she calls “felicitous falsehoods,” including models, idealizations, 
curve-smoothing, ceteris paribus claims, and thought experiments, figure ineliminably in 
successful science. And yet, today’s science, dependent as it is on falsehoods, nonetheless 
“provides an understanding of the natural order” (15). Elgin thus advocates replacing the 
epistemic aim of knowledge, requiring truth, with the epistemic aim of ‘objectual’ 
understanding—“a tapestry of interconnected commitments that collectively constitute an 
understanding of a domain” (16). Importantly, on her view, this understanding does not require 
truth.  
 
I largely agree with Elgin on these points. One of my favorite considerations that she raises in 
support of this move regards the traditional epistemic requirements of justified and/or reliable 
true belief. Elgin points out that justification, reliability, and belief are all taken to be threshold 
requirements, while truth has been seen as an absolute requirement. Why not, Elgin suggests, 
understand the truth requirement as also subject to a threshold? Then “epistemic acceptability 
turns not on whether [a proposition] is true, but on whether it is true enough” (16, italics in 
original). This change requires a related move of replacing belief with a more generic 
requirement of epistemic acceptance, since it seems we should not believe what we know to be 
false. All of this purports to solve the deep problem Elgin has posed about today’s science. 
Idealizations and all the rest cannot be true, but they can be true enough to provide genuine 
understanding. And understanding, in turn, is know-how: knowing “how to draw the inferences 
and perform the actions that the understanding licenses” (56). Or so Elgin holds.  
 
This reorientation, Elgin suggests, requires deeper epistemic shifts: in particular, toward 
“holism, nonfactivism, and a reconception of the basis of epistemic normativity” (31). 
Nonfactivism is required because accounts that provide understanding may include felicitous 
falsehoods, i.e., nontruths, and because understanding comes in degrees. As Elgin emphasizes, 
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the history of science and individuals’ scientific education illustrate this, as it seems we want to 
say in both cases that advances in understanding occur along the way, even as we recognize 
that full understanding has not been achieved.  
 
The other two epistemic shifts Elgin calls for—to holism and the basis of epistemic 
normativity—comprise what I have identified as the second part of the project. Elgin’s holism is 
a coherentist view of justification in terms of the systematic interconnection among epistemic 
commitments in what she calls reflective equilibrium. This is a fully internalist view; justification 
arises not from reliability but from the appearance of reliability. And, it seems this reflective 
equilibrium is how Elgin wants to cash out epistemic acceptability, her proposed replacement 
for truth: “whether a representation… is acceptable turns on whether it is an element of an 
account in reflective equilibrium” (89).  
 
I have a concern about this move, as I think it fails to live up to the goals of Elgin’s project. One 
implication of idealizations in science is that, considered across different scientific 
representations, posits are regularly inconsistent with one another. Idealized assumptions in 
one investigation regularly contradict idealized assumptions in another, and this is by design. 
The ideal gas law assumes no intermolecular forces among particles, while van der waals 
equation assumes the existence of these forces. Both can be used to represent the same gas. 
One model of a trait—say, a bird’s feather color—presumes simple inheritance, whereas 
another model details the genetic basis for the trait. Elgin’s move of shifting from truth to true 
enough seems to emphasize and legitimize this feature of science. But, cashing out epistemic 
acceptability, Elgin’s threshold requirement for when a posit is true enough, in terms of 
participation in a broad, coherent account undermines this. On the resulting view, posits may 
not need to be true in a correspondence sense, but they must be consistent across a broad 
understanding of a domain: “Not only must the commitments be internally coherent and 
consistent, they must cohere with and be consistent with other things we reflectively endorse” 
(113). If this is so, it eliminates as unacceptable many of the felicitous falsehoods that motivate 
Elgin’s project.  
 
In my view, to account for the role felicitous falsehoods play in science, we must also be able to 
account for the inconsistency among the posits of different representations that, together, 
comprise the scientific account of any given phenomenon. I’ll return to this below.  
 
I haven’t yet said anything about the shift in the basis of epistemic normativity that Elgin calls 
for. For purposes of space, I’ll be brief on this topic. Elgin’s internalism also influences this part 
of her account: “epistemic standards are vindicated not by [any] external end, but by being 
products and promoters of responsible epistemic agency” (91). The bulk of the work for this 
part of the project is, then, in the development of an account of what epistemic agency 
amounts to. What results is an account of what Elgin calls ‘procedural objectivity,’ an epistemic 
standard that results from the execution of responsible epistemic agency.   
 
Let’s move on to the third part of the project I identified above. Elgin is clear that her view 
about how science generates understanding also applies to other disciplines. Just as felicitous 
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falsehoods in science pave the way to understanding while failing to meet the requirement of 
truth, so do felicitous falsehoods in other disciplines, ranging from philosophy and history to 
the arts. Indeed, Elgin focuses quite a bit on motivating works of art as legitimate sources of 
understanding. Elgin suggests that aesthetic judgments meet her standard for procedural 
objectivity. An interpretation of some instance of artistic expression, then, can yield an 
understanding on par with other disciplinary understanding. Further, artistic expression itself—
Elgin’s examples include dance and historic monuments—can figure into an understanding of a 
discipline beyond the art—in these examples, emotion and history, respectively.  
 
This is possible, on Elgin’s view, because artistic expression can exemplify targeted features of 
the world. Exemplification is a central feature of Elgin’s project that I have not yet addressed. 
Something exemplifies a feature by (1) instantiating that feature and (2) referring to that 
feature in virtue of instantiating it. Thus, a paint color card exemplifies a given color of paint, 
the ideal gas law exemplifies relationships in a set of magnitudes that can be described 
mathematically, and the Vietnam War Memorial exemplifies the volume and trajectory of 
American casualties in the war. It’s worth asking whether literal instantiation is involved in all 
the instances of conveying understanding on which Elgin focuses, but I won’t dwell on this 
question here.  
 
Instead I want to raise a broad concern with Elgin’s approach to accounting for felicitous 
falsehoods in science. Above I suggested that Elgin’s proposed definition of epistemic 
acceptability doesn’t factor in variability, and thus inconsistency, among posits in science. More 
generally, I believe Elgin’s account doesn’t do much to accommodate the variability that is part 
and parcel with a departure from truth. This plays out in a few related ways.  
 
One motivation for Elgin’s project is the need for variability in the truth-status of our posits and 
our doxastic attitudes toward those posits. But, as I understand the development of the project, 
this variability has not been achieved, at least not explicitly. Epistemic acceptability may be a 
broadened category from truth, but Elgin’s coherentism provides no obvious basis for a 
distinction between true and untrue epistemically acceptable posits. It seems both categories 
of posit are simply subject to the requirement that they feature in a coherent account of some 
discipline.  
 
A related point can be made regarding the relationship between knowledge and understanding. 
Granting the epistemic significance of nonfactive understanding (which, following Elgin, I do), it 
seems an important part of the ensuing epistemic work involves grounding the distinction 
between this understanding and old-fashioned knowledge. But I don’t see how the account 
developed in this book accomplishes this. What is truth, and what is knowledge, above and 
beyond—or perhaps different in kind from—epistemic acceptability and participation in a 
coherent account endorsed by an epistemically responsible agent? I’m not sure how Elgin 
would answer that question.  
 
Here’s another form of variability Elgin’s account doesn’t explicitly support. In a given 
representation, some posits are held to a higher standard than others. The Lotka-Volterra 
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model assumes that predators have limitless appetites, but none do—this is fine. The model 
also assumes exponential growth of the prey population without predation, and if this isn’t 
roughly accurate of some prey population, the model won’t be very useful. This variability is 
important to motivating the epistemic significance of falsehoods, I think. One might reasonably 
hold the Lotka-Volterra model to be approximately true of some predator-prey system, but one 
cannot claim the assumption of predators with limitless appetites is approximately true. The 
latter is an idealization—a posit made without regard for whether it’s true and often with full 
knowledge it’s false. Yet Elgin treats all such models as felicitous falsehoods. By doing so, she 
misses an important form of variability in doxastic attitude and corresponding variability in 
epistemic acceptability that at least exists in science. 
 
True Enough has the important and interesting aim of accounting for the epistemic value of 
felicitous falsehoods, from science to art. But I worry that the resulting account is at best 
incomplete due to its failure to support some important epistemic distinctions: between truth 
and felicitous falsehoods, between knowledge and nonfactive understanding, and between 
idealizations and the approximately accurate models that make use of them. I think Elgin is 
right that truth is merely one variety of epistemic acceptability. But, in my view, the 
requirements for epistemic acceptability vary with both the role played by a posit in a 
representation and the specific epistemic aim the representation achieves. That variability 
seems to be lacking from Elgin’s account.  
 
In my view, we don’t just need a threshold concept of truth. We need a variable threshold. 
Sometimes we seek true beliefs. Many other times our epistemic purposes are met with 
accounts that are true enough, and that rely essentially on felicitous falsehoods. I don’t think 
True Enough has accomplished this variable threshold.  
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